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ABSTRACT 
Financing innovation presents informational and control problems for the financier, 
and different solutions are used for funding of US companies and universities.  In this 
paper we examine how funding characteristics influenced the change in innovation 
during the 2007-8 financial crisis for both.  We extend prior theories of external 
financing’s effect on company performance during crises, firstly to university 
performance, and secondly to show the influence of time variation in aggregate 
funding.  Empirical results are consistent with our theory: external dependence and 
asset intangibility had a limited effect on company innovation on entering the crisis, 
but increased university innovation.  Overall, however, company patenting was more 
robust than university patenting, despite the out-performance being masked by 
respective portfolio characteristics. 
 
Keywords: Innovation, patenting, economic crisis, financing constraint 
 
1 Introduction 
The 2007-8 financial crisis marked a period of financial decline and disruption 
unusual since 1945 (Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), figure 1).  Defaults on loans in the 
US subprime mortgage market resulted directly and indirectly in losses to lenders and 
their resulting bankruptcies (Acharya et al, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009).  The cost of 
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lending rose across many debt instruments (Acharya et al, 2009), and the crisis spread 
to international financial markets through losses and reduced availability of external 
finance (Claessens et al, 2010). 
 
The resulting real economic disruption affected industrial innovation.  Paunov (2012) 
finds that many Latin American companies stopped innovation projects, while 
Archibugi et al (2013b) and Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) determine broad 
innovation expenditure reductions for European companies.  Laperche et al’s (2011) 
examination of French businesses finds them streamlining and prioritising R&D 
during the crisis.  Makonnen (2013) looks at European government R&D 
expenditures by innovation type, and shows that governments tended to reduce their 
budgets during the crisis. 
 
If funding sources suffered losses in the crisis, or if their means of transferring funds 
to recipients were interrupted, the cost of finance would have risen and institutions 
dependent on it would have found their operations curtailed (Campello et al, 2010; 
Dell’Ariccia et al, 2008; Kroszner et al, 2007).  Research on the 2007-8 crisis’ effect 
on innovation has examined the role of dependence on external finance in passing.  
Paunov’s (2012) investigation of Latin American companies uses indicator variables 
for corporate access to public funding (which significantly reduces the chance of 
discontinuing an innovation project) and private external funding (which has no 
significant effect).  Archibugi et al’s (2013a) European study uses an indicator 
variable for whether companies considered availability to be an innovation obstacle 
prior to the crisis.  It has a negative insignificant effect on innovation expenditure 
growth before the crisis, and positive insignificant effect during it.  Filippetti and 
Archibugi (2011) examine behaviour of an ordinal variable indicating whether 
European firms moved from decreasing innovation investment to maintaining or 
increasing it during the crisis (or other permutations of this movement).  They find 
that in countries with large national private credit markets there was a tendency to 
move from declining investment to increasing investment during the crisis, and 
interpret the result as showing that the financial system depth counteracts the effect of 
the financial crisis. 
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In this paper we address more fully questions about whether necessity and ability to 
attract funding had a major effect on innovation during the crisis.  How did US 
company innovation respond to external funding requirements during the crisis?  
What was the response of US university innovation?  How did their innovation 
respond to asset intangibility, a measure of the ability to attract external funding? 
 
To answer these questions, we examine the funding relations that financiers have with 
companies and universities, and how they are affected by the crisis.  We find that the 
change during the crisis in aggregate R&D funding to companies and universities can 
be used to predict how their innovation responds to external funding dependence.  We 
also determine the relation between asset intangibility and innovation for both types 
of innovator.  The results are used to predict that when US companies are undertaking 
innovation, the dependence of a class of project on external finance does not 
significantly change output from that class during the crisis.  By contrast, when 
universities are innovating, more externally dependent classes have increased output 
during the crisis.  A further prediction is that if a project class has a higher ratio of 
intangible to total assets, then its innovative output will increase during the crisis for 
university innovators. 
 
We test our hypotheses by examining how predicted patent counts change during the 
crisis for each innovator type.  A database is constructed by joining US patent data 
with Compustat data, in which the unit of analysis is patent counts in each patent class.  
The construction allows us to associate measures of external funding dependence, 
R&D intensity, and other financial quantities to specific innovation classes and their 
statistics.  The empirical results are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions.  
We use our parameter estimates to investigate the effect of US company innovation 
responding to the crisis in the same way as US university innovation, but acting on the 
same portfolio of US company innovation projects, and vice versa.  US company 
responses are associated with more patenting than US university responses, acting 
both through financial and non-financial effects. 
 
Section 2 looks at aggregate innovation funding to US companies and universities, 
section 3 gives our theoretical framework, section 4 describes our data, section 5 gives 
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our empirical method, section 6 presents our results, section 7 looks at counterfactuals, 
and section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Aggregate innovation funding before and during the crisis 
2.1 Funding sources 
In 2008, total R&D expenditures in the US were $404 billion, or 2.8 percent of GDP 
(National Science Board (2012), appendix tables 4-1 and 4-44).  US business R&D 
alone accounted for 1.7 percent of GDP, with government accounting for a further 0.8 
percent of GDP.  Universities and colleges invested 0.1 percent of GDP from their 
own funds, with smaller investments from non-profit and foreign sources making up 
the balance.   
 
Industrial R&D is mainly self-funded by industry, with industrial self-funding 
accounting for around 90 percent of total expenditure throughout the 2000s (National 
Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-3).  Government funding rose slightly to 13 
percent in 2008 and 14 percent in 2009, but remained at historically low levels having 
exceeded 50 percent throughout most of the 1960s. 
 
By comparison, around two thirds of funding for university R&D came from 
government in the 2000s, and industry only provided around six percent (National 
Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-3).  Internal university and college monies 
accounted for about a fifth of the total, with non-profit funding outstripping industrial 
funding in the final years of the decade.  The funding shares were quite stable. 
 
2.2 The effect of the financial crisis 
Many US banks and financial institutions faced large declines in their capital reserves 
during the 2007-8 financial crisis.  Debt defaults were common, credit lines were 
quickly used up by borrowers, and short-term creditors to banks withdrew their 
lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).  As a consequence, a number became 
bankrupt, and others were severely financially compromised.  Regaining sufficient 
reserves became important for maintaining an acceptable level of bankruptcy risk and 
to meet regulatory requirements.  The opportunity cost of loaning new money 
therefore increased sharply.  The increased difficulty in raising finance is manifested 
in aggregate data: bank loans to the corporate sector fell sharply from the middle of 
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2007 (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), and a precipitous decline was also observed in 
venture capital funding (OECD, 2009). 
 
Government finances were also severely impacted by the financial crisis.  
Nevertheless, despite large deficits developed country governments generally 
provided substantial fiscal stimuli over the crisis period (OECD (2009), figure 5).  In 
the US, the total fiscal package between 2008 and 2010 exceeded five percent of 2008 
GDP.  Specific funds for innovative investment were made available through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, 2009) which was passed in 
February 2009.  The occurrence of an increase in government support for industrial 
R&D at the same time as a substantial downturn in industry’s own funding was 
unique in the period since 1953 (National Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-3). 
 
Industry self-funding for industrial R&D underwent a large decline in 2009 at an 
annual rate of 5.5 percent, marking the second largest percentage decline since the 
1950s (National Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-3).  The absolute level 
remained near historically record levels.  Government expenditure in 2008 and 2009 
rose with fiscal measures including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
but was still far less than industrial funding.  The extra government spending was not 
sufficient to offset the decline in industrial expenditure in 2009.  Nevertheless, total 
R&D funding to industry in 2009 was at its second highest level ever. 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
3.1 Corporate innovation during the crisis 
Innovation can be expensive (DiMasi et al, 2003; Adams and Brantner, 2006; DiMasi 
and Grabowski, 2007), time-consuming (Griffin, 1997), and risky (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1995).  It may require substantial financing over extended periods in 
the presence of high risk.  Some companies may be able to use internal funds to 
finance their R&D, but many will not have sufficient available assets and will have to 
seek external financing for innovation.  There are a number of difficulties for a 
commercial external funding source that are liable to restrict the availability of 
external finance, or at least make it more expensive than internal finance (Hall, 2002).  
One problem is information asymmetry between investors and innovators.  Because 
innovation is usually technically demanding, and because innovators often want to 
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preserve secrecy to protect their ideas from rivals, investors generally know less about 
the projects than the innovators.  Thus, a lemons market (Akerlof, 1970) can emerge 
where investors make higher charges than the better innovators will accept, and the 
market shrinks. 
  
Financial markets connect investors with fund recipients and can mitigate these 
informational problems (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  Expert intermediaries operate in 
financial markets, and they can monitor agent behaviour more closely and enforce 
better corporate governance.  Financial markets often require companies operating on 
them to follow accounting and disclosure rules, and adopt behavioural standards.  
These requirements may improve investor knowledge about the companies. 
 
A financial crisis can affect the ability of companies to finance themselves on a 
commercial basis.  In the 2007-8 crisis, funds available from commercial sources 
were reduced by large scale defaults experienced against their portfolios particularly 
from US sub-prime mortgages (Calomiris, 2008), which resulted in reduction of 
revenue streams either directly or through counterparty exposure.  The inability to use 
these assets as collateral reduced the sources’ borrowing ability and so the cost of 
funds available for investment (Acharya et al, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 
2009).  In addition to contraction in the available stock of funding, potential 
innovators may be less attractive as recipients of funding due to a concurrent 
recession.  The value of monitoring to information intermediaries may be reduced in a 
depressed market and the credibility of their monitoring may fall for potential 
investors (Holmström and Tirole, 1997), so increasing the uncertainty associated with 
investment.  
 
To elaborate on the consequences of these considerations, it is helpful to consider the 
problems solved by investors and managers considering investment in a project.  A 
private investor deciding on whether to invest in the project during the crisis expects 
to receive an immediate utility (net of investment cost) of  
 
εµ +Σ−  
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where μ is the net income from investment, Σ is a measure of the risk from investment 
due to the crisis interrupting normal market information provision and so leading to 
ignorance about managerial quality, and ε is an error term with distribution function 
)(εf .  The crisis risk Σ declines with a rise in T, the level of tangible assets available 
as collateral to protect against the consequences of imperfect information, so 
0/ <Σ dTd .  Investment occurs if 
 
0>+Σ− εµ  
 
or 
 
µε −Σ> . 
 
The manager who has perfect information about their own managerial quality would 
act on behalf of the investor and invest if 
 
µε −> . 
 
Thus, the excess in investment by managers over external investors during the crisis 
occurs in the region given by 
 
µεµ −>≥−Σ        (1) 
 
This is the region in which a project that had to be entirely externally financed would 
not be given approval, while the same project that was entirely internally financed 
would result in investment. 
 
Prior to the crisis, the market informational provision functions normally, and so the 
investor faces no crisis risk and 0=Σ .  They receive an immediate net utility from 
investment of 
 
εµ +b  
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where μb is the net income from investment before the crisis.  Since there is a 
recession at the same time as the financial crisis, µµ >b .  Investment occurs if 
 
bµε −> . 
 
Investment occurs before the crisis but not during it if  
 
bµεµ −>≥−Σ , 
 
which happens with probability ∫
−Σ
−
µ
µ
εε
b
df )( .  As we saw in section 2, there was a small 
change in observed company investment during the crisis relative to investment 
before it, so this probability is small. 
 
From equation (1), the probability that a manager invests but an investor does not 
invest is ∫
−Σ
−
µ
µ
εε df )( .  Since µµ >b , it follows that 
 
0)()( >> ∫∫
−Σ
−
−Σ
−
µ
µ
µ
µ
εεεε dfdf
b
 
 
and so there is a very small probability that a project would be financed if internal 
finance is available but not financed if external finance is necessary.  It follows that 
there is a very small negative change in expected investment when the project moves 
from being entirely internally dependent to entirely externally dependent.  Assuming 
innovative outputs are positively related to investment, we then have the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: For US companies during the financial crisis, dependence on external finance will 
not change significantly the innovative output from project classes. 
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We next investigate the effect of asset intangibility on innovation during the crisis.  
Intangible assets N are assumed to rise with the level of investment, other things being 
equal, so 0/ >dIdN .  We also assume that innovative outputs P, being a subset of 
intangible assets, increase when they do, so 0/ >dNdP . 
 
From equation (1), we have the lower and upper limits on the region over which non-
investment occurs.  Since 0/ <Σ dTd , the upper limit µ−Σ  reduces with tangible 
assets T, while the lower limit µ−  is unchanged and so the probability of investment 
rises.  Hence the expected investment rises as well and 0/ >dTdI . 
 
The intangibility ratio of a company is the value of intangible assets divided by the 
value of total assets, or )/( NTN + .  It can measure how much protection an investor 
has in the event of a company being wound up, and has been as a performance 
determinant in financial crises (Kroszner et al, 2007).  The response of innovative 
outputs to changes in the intangibility ratio is given by ))/(( NTNd
dP
+
.  We analyse 
the properties of this quantity. When the derivative is non-zero, the inverse function 
theorem says that 
1))/((
))/((
−





 +
=
+ dP
NTNd
NTNd
dP
.  The derivative in the bracket 
can be expanded using the chain rule to give 
 
1))/((
))/((
−





 +
=
+ dI
NTNd
dN
dI
dP
dN
NTNd
dP
 
 
or, using the inverse function theorem again and the product rule, 
 
1
2
11
)()//(
/
))/((
−
−−














+
+−
+












=
+ NT
NdIdNdIdT
NT
dIdN
dI
dN
dN
dP
NTNd
dP
 
 
or 
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1
22 )()/()(
1)/())/((
−




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


+
−
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
+
−
+
=
+ NT
NdIdT
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−
−




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


+



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

−


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
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+
−+=
+ NT
N
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NT
N
dI
dNNT
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dN
dN
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NTNd
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The terms 
dN
dP
, 
dI
dN
, NT + , 





+
−
NT
N1 , 
dT
dI
, and 
NT
N
+
 are all positive, so 
0))/(( >+ NTNd
dP
 if and only  
 
01
1
>
+






−





+
−
−
NT
N
dT
dI
NT
N
dI
dN
 
 
or 
 
T
N
dT
dI
dI
dN
> . 
 
Thus, innovative outputs grow as the intangibility ratio increases if and only if the 
product of growth of intangible assets as investment increases and the growth of 
investment as tangible assets increase is sufficiently large.  In other words, growth in 
intangible assets is induced by tangible asset growth through investment, and for 
innovative output growth to be associated with a rising intangibility ratio, the 
intangible asset growth has to be large enough to outpace the tangible asset growth.  
Hence, we cannot state certainly how the intangibility ratio will affect company 
innovative outputs. 
 
3.2 University innovation during the crisis 
Many US university laboratories consider basic research as their primary objective, 
with much of their time spent on publishing academic research (Bozeman, 2000).  
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Nevertheless, their work often has an applied character (Mowery et al, 2001), and 
some of that work gives rise to commercial innovations.  The funding for such 
innovations may come from, among other sources, industry or government.  The latter 
source has become more important through a series of government policy initiatives 
including the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowing universities to commercialise federally 
funded innovations, the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 and its 
amendment in 1993 facilitating research collaborations, and the Advanced 
Technology Program from 1990 and the Technology Innovation Program from 2007 
providing funding for research projects that often resulted in university-private sector 
partnerships (Bozeman, 2000; Hall et al, 2003). 
 
A source providing funding to a university faces information problems similar to 
those faced by a funder of a company.  It typically has less information than the 
university or the funded academic about their ability to implement a project, or about 
the project’s progress.  However, commercial sources funding universities usually 
extract information from the recipients directly rather than through the information 
intermediaries commonly used in financing companies, reflecting the frequent utility 
to the funding source of the university knowledge generated.  The direct information 
extraction can take the form of technical queries, consultancy, direct employment, co-
authoring papers, and hiring graduates and post-doctoral researchers (Boardman and 
Ponomariov, 2009; Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007).  The US federal and state 
governments generally limit the information gap by competitive tender of grants, with 
applications having to give detailed information on their planned technological and 
financial aspects (see for example, Department of Health and Human Services (2007) 
or National Science Foundation (2013)).  The applications are subject to monitoring 
during their progress and the possibility of non-renewal for ongoing projects.  Expert 
evaluation of applications is maintained by use of peer review. 
 
The provision of funding for US university innovation is not necessarily as badly 
disrupted by a financial crisis as provision for company innovation.  The largest 
university funding source is the US government which is less financially constrained 
than US companies during crises.  It could run deficits and make available extra funds 
to universities, which it did in 2007-8.  Available funds from commercial sources may 
be subject to acute pressure due to the financial crisis and recession, as described 
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above.  Given the non-market form of the informational ties between universities and 
capital providers, the collapse of the information provision function of the market 
does not affect information passing directly between them. 
 
These observations can be given a formal mathematical form in order to theorise on 
how university innovation responded to the financial crisis.  We analyse investment 
by a government investor who values the income from a project (whether it accrues to 
the government or the university), and also other consequences from investment.  
During the crisis, a government investor in a project expects to receive an immediate 
utility (net of investment cost) of  
 
εµ ++ P  
 
where μ is the net income from investment, P is a measure of the political value of 
other consequences of investment in excess of any benefits before the crisis, and ε is 
an error term with distribution function )(εf . 
 
Investment occurs if 
 
0>++ εµ P  
 
or 
 
µε −−> P . 
 
A commercially motivated university manager will invest if 
 
µε −> . 
 
Thus, the excess in investment by investors over managers during the crisis occurs in 
the region given by 
 
µεµ −−>≥− P        (2) 
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This is the region in which a project that was did not have access to external finance 
would not be given approval, while the same project that was externally financed 
would result in investment. 
 
Prior to the crisis, the additional political benefits of investment in the crisis are not 
present, so 0=P .  They receive an immediate net utility from investment of 
 
εµ +b  
 
where μb is the net income from investment before the crisis.  Since there is a 
recession at the same time as the financial crisis, µµ >b .  Investment occurs if 
 
bµε −> . 
 
Investment occurs during the crisis but not before it if  
 
µεµ −−>≥− Pb , 
 
conditional on the political benefits being sufficiently large so that µµ −> bP .  The 
error term lies in the region with probability ∫
−
−−
b
P
df
µ
µ
εε )( .  In section 2, we saw that 
there was a reasonably large increase in observed government funding to R&D 
investment during the crisis relative to investment before it, so the probability is quite 
large. 
 
From equation (2), the probability that a investor would fund a project but a manager 
would not is ∫
−
−−
µ
µ
εε
P
df )( .  Since µµ >b , it follows that 
 
0)()( >> ∫∫
−
−−
−
−−
b
PP
dfdf
µ
µ
µ
µ
εεεε  
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and so there is a quite large probability that a project would be financed if external 
finance is necessary but not financed if internal finance is the source.  It follows that 
there is a quite large change in expected investment when the project moves from 
being entirely internally dependent to entirely externally dependent.  Assuming 
innovative outputs are positively related to investment, we then have the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: For US universities during the financial crisis, dependence on external finance 
will increase the innovative output of project classes. 
 
The effect of the intangibility ratio on university innovation during the crisis is 
analysed in a similar way as for company innovation.  We again assume intangible 
assets N rise with the level of investment so 0/ >dIdN , and innovative outputs P 
increase with intangible assets, so 0/ >dNdP .  The limits on the region in which 
investors invest more than managers in equation (2) are both independent of tangible 
assets T, so investment I during the crisis is independent of T, and 0/ =dIdT . 
 
The derivative of innovative outputs with respect to the intangibility ratio can be 
expanded as before to 
 
1))/((
))/((
−





 +
=
+ dI
NTNd
dN
dI
dP
dN
NTNd
dP
 
 
or 
 
1
1)())/((
−






+
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



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+
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since 0/ =dIdT .  The terms 
dN
dP
, 
dI
dN
, NT + , and 





+
−
NT
N1  are all positive, so 
0))/(( >+ NTNd
dP
. 
 
So, university innovative outputs grow as the intangibility ratio rises.  We therefore 
have the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: For US universities during the financial crisis, higher intangibility ratios will 
increase the innovative output of project classes. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
The main variables for testing our hypotheses will be external financial dependence 
and the asset intangibility ratio, whose construction we will describe in section 4.  We 
also include several control variables in the analysis.  Together with lagged innovative 
outputs, they are used to capture other influences on the change in innovation during 
the crisis, including the effect of demand shifts due to the associated recession.  In this 
subsection, we present the expected effect of the control variables on innovation. 
 
The novelty of the type of innovated product 
The financial crisis may have been associated with either of two Schumpeterian 
hypotheses, namely creative accumulation or creative destruction (Archibugi et al 
2013a).  Under the creative accumulation hypothesis, innovations are incremental and 
due to established innovators.  They are the innovators who persist during the crisis, 
and we may expect them to build on their existing work with more established 
products.  Thus, the age of the product type could be positively associated with 
changes in the volume of innovation.  Under the creative destruction hypothesis, 
innovations are radical and occur in new areas.  The financial crisis created instability 
and weakened the position of existing innovators.  The crisis would be a time of new 
product type introduction, so that the age of the product type could be negatively 
associated with change in the amount of innovation.  We do not take a prior position 
on which hypothesis best describes innovation during the crisis, and leave the data to 
determine the result. 
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R&D intensity 
R&D intensity is measured as R&D divided by sales.  Between 2008 and 2009, R&D 
funding for companies reduced (National Science Board (2012), appendix table 4-3).  
As a result, they had lower funds for sustaining research in previously initiated 
projects and for bringing partially finished projects to completion.  The difficulties 
may have been most acute for expensive and risky R&D intensive projects.  Thus, 
during the financial crisis we may expect bigger declines in commercial innovation 
for companies undertaking more R&D intensive projects.  Universities had increased 
R&D funding indicating that the effect of R&D intensity would increase, but the 
impact would be moderated by their primary non-commercial objectives. 
 
Capital to labour ratio 
Large investments are made in R&D in the US (see section 2.1), and single successful 
innovative products can be very costly (see DiMasi et al (2003), Adams and Brantner 
(2006), and DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) for the costs of pharmaceuticals).  Human 
skill and ingenuity is important in the innovation process, and employee 
remunerations are a large cost in it.  For example, in 2008 the total wage bill for US 
corporate R&D workers was around $114 billion3 compared with total business R&D 
investment of $291 billion (see section 2.1).  We do not have any strong prior 
expectations of whether a high capital to labour ratio for a production process will be 
associated with higher or lower innovation rates.  During the financial crisis, capital 
was rationed and innovation projects dependent on capital may have been hindered 
more than those with greater dependence on labour.  Innovative output from such 
projects may have declined.  However, as we do not expect a strong initial relation 
between innovation and the capital to labour ratio, the decline may be weak.  
Kroszner et al (2007) finds the capital to labour ratio has an insignificant effect on 
industrial value added growth changes between financial crisis periods and the periods 
preceding them. 
 
                                                 
3
 National Science Board (2012), table 3-7 puts average annual salaries for science and engineering 
workers at $80,170 in 2010.  Table 3-13 gives total company R&D workers at 1,424,000 in 2008.  We 
multiply to give a total wage bill of $114 billion. 
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4 Data 
4.1 Preparation 
In this section, we present the data used in our empirical testing4.  It comes from two 
sources, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) online patent database and 
Compustat financial data.  The cross-sectional unit of analysis is patent class, a 
USPTO classification of inventions according to technological type.  There are 473 
such classes, given directly in the USPTO data.  For the Compustat financial data, we 
aggregate the data by industry code and then use the code to map into patent class.  
The patent class thus serves as a means of identifying technological and financial 
characteristics of innovation undertaken by US companies and US universities.  By 
construction, the quantities derived from the Compustat data (external dependence, 
intangibility, R&D intensity, and the capital to labour ratio) allow for the industrial 
composition of their patent class. 
 
USPTO data 
The USPTO online patent database contains details of patent applications in the US 
unless the applicant has explicitly requested privacy prior to grant.  Patent 
applications are published eighteen months after the applicant files for a patent.  The 
database records applicant name, country of residence of the organisation or person to 
whom the application is issued, the application date, and the patent class of the 
invention.  We accessed the data in March 2014. 
 
Compustat data 
We use data from all companies on Compustat for constructing our financial measures.  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Kroszner et al (2007) also use the full set of 
Compustat companies in preparing measures of external dependence, which results in 
the statistics reflecting the finances of US publicly quoted and larger companies.  Our 
measures are all ratios of financial quantities, and are used for companies and 
universities operating commercially by undertaking patenting.  Conceivably the 
relevant ratios of financial quantities in commercial operations run by US universities 
may be different from those in US companies.  If true, then our hypothesis testing 
remains valid if the adjustment factor between the financial ratios of companies and 
                                                 
4
 The data and STATA code used in estimation are available from the author on request. 
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university commercial operations is constant across different innovation projects.  
Moreover, we run separate estimates for companies and universities, so there are no 
interpretational ambiguities for a combined coefficient. 
 
Our statistics for Compustat data are grouped by two digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) System codes.  As our cross-sectional unit for estimation is the 
USPTO patent class, we map from SIC based statistics to patent class based statistics 
using the concordance file between the two classifications provided by USPTO 
(2008b).  The mapping to patent class is not unique as there are multiple subclasses 
which may be allocated different SIC codes, so we calculate average statistics over 
subclasses.  For every patent class, the percentage of each SIC code corresponding to 
the class is calculated.  The statistics for the patent class are derived as the sum of the 
percentage weighted statistics for the individual SIC codes.  The formulas take the 
form 
 
∑
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where SC is the statistic for patent class C, Si is the statistic for SIC code i, nC,i is the 
number of subclasses in class C corresponding to SIC code i, and the summations run 
over all SIC codes. 
 
As a means of determining the financial conditions under which an innovation was 
produced, the mapping is inevitably inexact.  The difficulty arises from the allocation 
of patents to specific industries, as noted by Jaffe and Palmer (1997) in their matching 
of patents to industrial environmental cost data.  An invention may have been 
produced by an innovator whose core operation is not in the SIC code allocated to the 
invention.  So the invention may have been produced in financial conditions that 
differ from those that apply to companies producing under the allocated SIC code.  
We assume that any mismatches occur as random noise in the data and do not distort 
our results. 
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Our statistics Si derived from Compustat data (external dependence, intangibility, 
R&D intensity, and the capital to labour ratio) all take the form of ratios and depend 
on the SIC code i.  To calculate them, we first calculate the corresponding statistics Si,j 
for each SIC code and company code j.  They are calculated as ten year averages over 
2000-9, with for example the intangibility ratio given by 
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where kji ,,ν  are the total intangible assets for company coded j in year k operating in 
industry i, and kji ,,τ  are the total tangible assets over the same period.  The statistic Si 
for the SIC code are then the median of Si,j over all companies. 
 
Variables 
Patent counts 
We use counts of patent applications as our measure of innovation within each patent 
class and split by innovator type, using USPTO data.  Patents have long been used as 
such a measure (Scherer 1965, Schmookler 1962), and their advantages and 
disadvantages extensively discussed (Archibugi and Pianta, 1996; Basberg, 1987; 
Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003).  The extent to which patents measure innovation may 
differ by innovator type.  Universities may have a lower proclivity to patent their 
innovation than companies because of their largely different objectives (Bozeman, 
2000).  We may nevertheless infer that a contraction due to the crisis in the number of 
innovations, and in particular in the number of innovations produced with a 
commercial orientation, will generally be associated with a reduction in the number of 
patents for any innovator type. 
 
We collect monthly data for the period from January 2006 to December 2009, giving 
348,000 patents in total.  There is an 18 month delay between filing and publication of 
applications, but as our data was collected in March 2014 the delay does not affect 
included applications.  Applications that are made with a request of privacy, and are 
due to be successfully granted, and take more than four years to process may not be 
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included in the data (with potentially greater effect on patent counts in later months).  
However, we expect the numbers to be small because the mean delay between patent 
application and issue or abandonment was 32 months in 2008 (USPTO (2008a), 
workload table 4) so that the large majority of applications would have been handled 
four years after they were made.  Moreover, any omissions will not change the 
comparative results across innovators. 
 
There is no single US country code to allow us to identify all US applicants on the 
USPTO database, but it does record the US state in which an American applicant is 
resident.  We sum the patent counts for each state to obtain a patent counts for the 
whole US.  The academic origin of applicants is not recorded on the USPTO database.  
We separate academic and non-academic applicants by searches on the applicant 
name.  A representative subset of academic applicants is identified by searching the 
name for the words “university”, “college”, “school”, or “institute of technology”.  
These search terms identify most of the primary institutional names for academic 
applicants, including the largest patenters5.  Some academic institutions may patent 
under secondary names omitting these terms, and these patents will be included in our 
non-academic counts.  As the number of company patents far exceeds university 
patents, the contamination of company patent counts will be very limited. 
 
External dependence 
External dependence is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditures not financed by 
net operating cash flow to capital expenditure.  The Compustat code for capital 
expenditures is capx, and for net operating cash flow is oancf, so the formula for 
external dependence is capxoancfcapx )( − .  The list of external dependence values 
by patent class is available at our website in .csv format6. 
 
Intangibility 
Intangibility is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets.  The Compustat code for 
intangible assets is intan, and for total assets is at. 
 
                                                 
5
 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/total_counts/univ_ct_list_2012.htm 
6
 http://ebasic.easily.co.uk/02E044/05304E/Ext_dep_by_patent_class.csv 
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The novelty of the innovated product class 
The novelty of the innovated product type is measured by the date at which the 
USPTO introduced the corresponding patent class.  The earliest establishment date is 
1899 for patent classes including wood turning products and envelopes.  The latest 
introduction date is 2007 for combinatorial chemistry technology. 
 
The USPTO class introduction date is likely to measure the novelty of a type of 
innovated product only with a delay.  It may not be immediately clear that the early 
patents in the product type represent a major departure from existing product types, 
and their citations will necessarily locate them within existing classes.  The USPTO 
may only wish to introduce a new class only when a sufficient number of relevant 
patents is reached, and the identification and decision processes will not be immediate.  
Our econometric method will absorb into the constant term the average delay between 
the date at which a product type was first innovated and the date at which the 
corresponding USPTO class was introduced7. 
 
R&D intensity 
R&D intensity is calculated as the ratio of R&D to sales.  The respective Compustat 
codes are xrd and sale. 
 
Capital to labour ratio 
The capital to labour ratio is calculated as fixed assets divided by number of 
employees.  The Compustat code for fixed assets is ppent, and for employees is emp. 
 
Time 
Time is measured in months since April 2001 (the first month of data availability), 
with April 2001 = 1. 
 
4.2 Summary statistics 
In table 1 we see summary statistics for the financial and other characteristics of the 
innovation undertaken by each innovator type.  The mean external dependence of 
company innovation is lower than university innovation.  For the classes in which 
                                                 
7
 Thanks to Pia Weiss for pointing out the likely difference between innovation date and patent class 
introduction date, and suggesting reasons for it. 
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companies innovate, internally generated funds are around 164 percent of total capital 
expenditures in US commercial conditions, while for universities the amount is 124 
percent.  The mean level of asset intangibility in those classes is similar for both 
innovator types at 14 and 15 percent.  The mean establishment dates of the patent 
classes in which they operate is also similar, in the second half of the 1970s.  Both 
innovate in the oldest and newest classes.  The R&D intensity is higher in classes in 
which companies innovate compared with those in which universities innovate.  The 
capital to labour ratio is lower for the projects of companies than those of universities. 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics for innovation portfolios of each innovator type 
 US companies US universities 
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
External 
dependence -0.64 -5.55 0.84 -0.24 -5.49 0.84 
Intangibility 0.14 0 0.66 0.15 0 0.66 
Date 
established 1975 1899 2007 1978 1899 2007 
R&D 
intensity 0.0029 0 0.0866 0.0017 0 0.0865 
Capital/labour 115.3 0 2783.3 173.3 0 2783.3 
Notes: mean values are weighted by patent counts. 
 
4.3 Changes in aggregate patent counts during the crisis 
Figure 1 shows aggregate patent counts by US companies.  There are 326,000 patents 
in total over the period 2006-9, and the aggregate patenting appears to slow down 
around the end of 2007.  To demonstrate the change in broad terms, the patent counts 
from the period 2006-7 are regressed on a time trend by OLS, and then the same is 
done for the period 2008-9.  The two fitted lines are superimposed on the graph.  The 
change in level and trend between the two periods is clear.  Figure 2 shows aggregate 
patent counts for US universities; there are 22,000 patents over the whole period.  
Their patenting seems to change after the start of the financial crisis, in both level and 
trend. 
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Figure 1. Aggregate patent counts by US companies with OLS lines fitted for 2006-7 and 2008-9. 
 
 
Figure 2. Aggregate patent counts by US universities with OLS lines fitted for 2006-7 and 2008-9. 
 
To examine whether the change in aggregate patent rates for US companies is 
significant, we ran F tests for the constant and trend coefficient in the pre-break and 
post-break periods being jointly equal, allowing for possible break dates between 
January 2007 and December 2009.  The most likely break date is at the end of 2007, 
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giving us confidence to take December 2007 as a change date in the subsequent 
analysis. 
 
To demonstrate the changes for patent classes around the financial crisis, we ran 
negative binomial estimations for patent counts in each class in the periods 2006-7 
and 2008-9, with the logarithm of the expected value linearly dependent on time (this 
procedure forms part of the estimation method we describe for our full analysis in 
section 5).  Predicted patent counts in January 2008 were calculated from the 
estimation results for both periods, giving us a set of predicted patents for the 2006-7 
estimates and a set for the 2008-9 estimates.  Figure 3 plots the predicted patents from 
the US company data as kernel densities.  The solid line shows the predictions from 
the 2006-7 estimates, and the dashed line shows the predictions from the 2008-9 
estimates.  The 2008-9 density is a compression towards zero of the 2006-7 density, 
representing a general reduction in patenting. 
 
 
Figure 3. Kernel density of estimated patents in January 2008 across patent classes.  Notes: the solid 
line is for estimates from 2006-7 and the dashed line is for estimates from 2008-9.  US company data is 
used. 
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Figure 4. Kernel density of estimated patents in January 2008 across patent classes.  Notes: the solid 
line is for estimates from 2006-7 and the dashed line is for estimates from 2008-9.  US university data 
is used. 
 
In figure 4, we see the corresponding densities for US universities.  The number of 
patent classes predicted to have just a single patent increases in the 2008-9 estimates, 
and there is again a broad compression towards zero, indicating a reduction in 
patenting. 
 
5. Empirical method 
In this section we present our testing and estimation method.  We assume a 
multiplicative model for predicted patent counts conditional on the information 
available during the crisis, relating it to the predicted patent counts prior to the crisis 
and an adjustment factor influencing the relation between the two.  The adjustment 
factor is exponential and guarantees positive patent counts, as is standard in the 
empirical literature (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).  The functional form is 
 
)'exp()|(|
,, iititi uXIpIp +Γ+=
−+ γα β     (3) 
 
where Ip ti |,  are predicted patent counts in patent class i at time t and conditional on 
information set I, I + is the information available during the crisis, I - is the information 
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available before the crisis, α, β and γ are constants with α > 0, Xi is a vector of time-
invariant patent class characteristics, Γ is a vector constant with the same dimension 
as Xi, and ui is a zero mean normal error. 
 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 examine how external dependence affects the change in 
innovation during the crisis for different innovator types.  Equation (3) may be written 
as 
 
)'exp()|()|/()|( 1
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The left hand side of the equation is the ratio of patents predicted during the crisis to 
those predicted before the crisis, and so measures innovation change.  We test 
hypothesis H1 by looking at the significance of external dependence on the right hand 
side of the equation when company data is used, and hypothesis H2 by looking at the 
sign and significance of external dependence when university data is used.  
Hypothesis H3 examines how intangibility ratios affect innovation, and we test it by 
looking at the sign and significance of the intangibility ratio on the right hand side of 
the equation when university data is used. 
 
Taking logs of equation (3) we have 
 
iititi uXIpIp +Γ+++=
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')|ln(ln)|ln(
,,
γβα .   (4) 
 
This specification for examining the crisis’ effect is similar to that used in Archibugi 
et al (2013a), where the change in innovation between two years is measured.  We 
could bring our specification even closer to their model by comparing changes in 
patents in successive time periods, t and t + 1.  However, we prefer to examine an 
instant effect, rather than a delayed one.  The reason is that any crisis effect may tend 
to correct itself over time especially in patent classes where it has been severe, so that 
an estimation using successive periods may not capture the full crisis effect.  
Moreover, we prefer to use extended evidence of patenting behaviour to estimate 
mean patenting rates rather than patent rates in one period, in order to reduce 
measurement volatility.  As a prediction method for calculating +Ip ti |,  and −Ip ti |, , 
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we could use averages or sums over successive periods (for example, to give annual 
rates of innovation, as in Archibugi et al (2013a)), which would be acceptable in the 
absence of trends in the data.  However, trends in patenting in each class are likely.  
So we use an equivalent method to averaging, but one which allows for trends.  We 
calculate the predicted patents +Ip ti |,  and −Ip ti |,  in class i at time t by running two 
sets of negative binomial regressions for counts in each patent class: 
 
tP iiti ψϕ +=)log( , ,       (5) 
Pi,t ~ negative binomial, 
 
where Pi,t are patent counts in class i at time t, and φi and ψi are class specific 
constants.  Patenting in each class may be generated by distinct processes and be at 
different life stages, and so we make no assumptions about the commonality of 
parameters across classes in generating predictions. 
 
The estimation is performed first over the 24 month period from January 2006 to 
December 2007, which we call the pre-crisis period, and then over the period from 
January 2008 to December 2009, which we term the crisis period.  We exclude any 
patent classes in which the number of patents is ten or less over the whole 2006 to 
2009 period.  Once we have the regression coefficients, we take −Ip ti |,  to be the 
predicted value at time t from the early period equation, and +Ip ti |,  to be the 
predicted value from the late period equation. 
 
We estimate equation (4) using OLS across classes i with robust standard errors, with 
the predicted patents evaluated in January 2008.  The influence of extreme patent 
class values is eliminated by excluding any classes in which the predicted January 
2008 patent counts from either the 2006-7 or 2008-9 periods exceed 100 for US 
companies, and 20 for US universities.  The exclusion is of less than the top seven 
percent of values for each innovator type. 
 
We also estimate a modified version of equation (4) using cumulative patents over a 
time period T, 
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The values for cumulative predicted patents are produced by predicting two sets of 
cumulative patents over the period T, using estimates from equation (5) based on the 
data from 2006-7 to predict −
∈
∑ Ip
Tt
ti |,  and from 2008-9 to predict +
∈
∑ Ip
Tt
ti |, .  In the 
OLS estimation of equation (6), we exclude classes with early estimated or late 
estimated cumulative patents exceeding 5000 for companies, and 500 for universities.  
Less than the top five percent of values are excluded for each innovator type. 
 
6 Results 
6.1 Immediate and cumulative effects of the financial crisis 
In this section we present our results, starting with the crisis’ immediate and 
cumulative effects on innovation in table 2.  The first two columns present regression 
results where the determined variable is the logarithm of the patent count in January 
2008 as predicted using data from 2008-9.  In column one, we see the results for US 
companies.  External dependence has an insignificant effect on the count, consistent 
with hypothesis one was that there would be no significant link between the two.  
Column two gives coefficients for US universities.  External dependence is 
significantly associated with increased patenting during the crisis, consistent with 
hypothesis two, while intangibility is significantly associated with increased patenting 
during the crisis, as anticipated in hypothesis three. 
 
Columns three and four look at regressions with the logarithm of cumulative predicted 
patents as determined variable.  Column three has results for companies.  External 
dependence has a significant positive effect on the cumulative patenting over 2008-9, 
indicating that the effect in January 2008 becomes more positive over time.  Column 
four presents results for universities, with a significant positive links between 
cumulative patenting and both external dependence and intangibility.  The same links 
are observed in January 2008. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of the logs of the predicted patent count at the start of the crisis and the sum of the 
predicted patent counts during the crisis 
Dependent 
variable: 
Log late predicted patents in 
January 2008 
Log late predicted patents 
cumulated over 2008-9 
 US companies US universities US companies US universities 
 OLS regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
External 
dependence 0.0254 0.1990* 0.0858** 0.2439** 
 0.0306 0.1012 0.0415 0.103 
Intangibility -0.0857 1.1103** 0.305 1.0084** 
 0.2238 0.4257 0.3645 0.4088 
Log early 
predicted 
patents 
0.9497*** 0.6994*** 0.7663*** 0.4038*** 
 0.0329 0.0617 0.036 0.0505 
Establishment 
date -0.0008 -0.0057** 0.0011 0.0018 
 0.0009 0.0025 0.0014 0.003 
R&D intensity -2.9369 -7.8922* -5.2830* -9.7988* 
 2.1868 4.7325 2.8048 5.6922 
Capital to 
labour ratio -0.0002** -0.0006** -0.0002* 0.0001 
 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 
Constant 1.488 11.0805** -1.225 -1.6421 
 1.7817 4.9167 2.646 6.0256 
     
R2 0.87 0.62 0.77 0.46 
Observations 369 140 372 134 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients. 
* Ten percent significance. 
** Five percent significance. 
*** One percent significance. 
 
6.2 Results split by age of patent class 
Table 3 presents estimations split by the age of the patent class, with new patent 
classes established after 1990 and old patent classes established before 1991.  This 
division gives a reasonable approximation for the split between high technology and 
other technology.  The results for new classes are shown in columns one and two.  
Coefficient estimates for US companies are presented in column one, where external 
dependence is insignificantly associated with patenting.  The results for US 
universities are in column two, where neither external dependence nor intangibility is 
 208 
associated with patenting.  The small sample size will have influenced the low 
coefficient significance. 
 
Table 3 
Determinants of the logs of the predicted patent count in January 2008, by patent class age 
 Dependent variable: log late predicted patents in January 2008 
 New classes Old classes 
 US companies US universities US companies US universities 
 OLS regressions   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
External 
dependence -0.0428 0.0186 0.0224 0.2162* 
 0.118 0.3345 0.0313 0.1102 
Intangibility 0.1676 0.7474 -0.2079 1.1014** 
 0.9583 1.3296 0.2272 0.468 
Log early 
predicted 
patents 
1.1308*** 0.6025*** 0.9223*** 0.7856*** 
 0.072 0.1117 0.0364 0.0767 
Establishment 
date -0.0065 0.0296 -0.0002 -0.0078** 
 0.0233 0.0342 0.001 0.0036 
R&D intensity 4.0078 -17.9753 -2.8549 -6.7787 
 4.2495 10.7814 2.3566 4.7261 
Capital to 
labour ratio -0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0001 -0.0003 
 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
Constant 12.2738 -59.3178 0.4251 15.1319** 
 46.257 68.3041 1.9659 6.9697 
     
R2 0.92 0.6 0.86 0.67 
Observations 61 43 308 97 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients. 
* Ten percent significance. 
** Five percent significance. 
*** One percent significance. 
 
Columns three and four give estimates for data based on old patent classes.  Column 
three shows that for US companies there was no significant association between 
external dependence and patenting.  A significant positive relation is shown for US 
universities in column four.  The association is also significant and positive between 
external dependence and patenting.  Hypotheses one, two, and three all hold for 
patenting in old classes. 
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6.3 Estimates based on OLS predictions of patenting 
In calculating the results in section 6.1, the predicted patent counts are derived from 
negative binomial estimation within each patent class, so they grow exponentially 
over time.  In this section, we calculate results in which the predictions are derived 
from OLS estimations in each class, with linear growth in patenting over time.  The 
extra caution comes at the cost of allowing negative patenting in classes and of a 
discrete non-symmetric random variable being approximated by a normal variable; 
however, as section 7 will show, the aggregate OLS behaviour predicts actual 
patenting after the crisis more closely than aggregate negative binomial predictions. 
 
We continue to estimate results from our main cross sectional regressions given by 
equations (4) and (6).  However for predicting patents within classes we replace the 
negative binomial equation (5) with an OLS equation 
 
tiiiti vtP ,, ++= ψϕ , 
 
where φi and ψi are class specific constants and vi,t is a zero mean normal variable.  
The estimation is performed over the period from January 2006 to December 2007, 
then over January 2008 to December 2009.  We again exclude any patent classes in 
which the number of patents is ten or less over the whole 2006 to 2009 period.  Once 
we have the regression coefficients, we use predictions from the early period and late 
period estimations as variables in our main regressions. 
 
Table 4 contains our results, with the first two columns presenting coefficient 
estimates when the dependent variable is the logarithm of predicted January 2008 
patents.  In column one, US company data is used and external dependence is found to 
have an insignificant association with patenting, as expected from hypothesis one.  
Column two shows that for US universities there is a significant positive relation 
between external dependence and patenting, consistent with hypothesis two.  The 
relation between intangibility and the patent count is significant and positive, as 
hypothesis three anticipated.  Overall, the evidence provided for hypotheses 1, 2, and 
3 is strong here as in the main table 2. 
 210 
 
Table 4 
Determinants of the logs of the predicted patent count at the start of the crisis and the sum of the 
predicted patent counts during the crisis; prediction by OLS 
Dependent 
variable: 
Log late predicted patents in 
January 2008 
Log late predicted patents 
cumulated over 2008-9 
 US companies US universities US companies US universities 
 OLS regressions   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
External 
dependence 0.0329 0.2534** 0.0689** 0.2781*** 
 0.0319 0.1001 0.0289 0.0667 
Intangibility -0.1108 1.1115** 0.3049 0.8959*** 
 0.2471 0.4496 0.2076 0.3237 
Log early 
predicted 
patents 
0.9447*** 0.8276*** 0.8857*** 0.6662*** 
 0.0394 0.0446 0.0393 0.0567 
Establishment 
date -0.0006 -0.0042* -0.0002 -0.0026 
 0.001 0.0024 0.001 0.0022 
R&D intensity -4.1775 -7.2524 -3.5887 -9.0298*** 
 2.8012 4.5322 2.188 3.2574 
Capital to 
labour ratio -0.0001* -0.0005*** -0.0002*** -0.0003** 
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
Constant 1.3011 8.1784* 0.8929 6.4551 
 1.9036 4.6957 1.8581 4.31 
     
R2 0.88 0.74 0.89 0.68 
Observations 386 134 373 129 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients. 
* Ten percent significance. 
** Five percent significance. 
*** One percent significance. 
 
Columns three and four report estimates where the dependent variable is the logarithm 
of patents cumulated over 2008-9.  In column three we see that for companies there is 
a positive relation between external dependence and cumulative patenting.  Column 
four employs university data, and shows that there is a significant positive association 
between cumulative patenting and both external dependence and intangibility.  As a 
whole, the findings are similar to those in table 2 where negative binomial projections 
are used. 
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7. Counterfactuals 
The growth of unregulated debts among financial institutions has been presented as a 
major contributing factor to the 2007-8 crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009; Calomiris, 2008), 
and market-based solutions have been advanced to alter and constrain the behaviour 
of financial institutions (Acharya et al, 2009).  They offer the possibility of insulating 
the financial and real economies from systemic build up of risk, such as that emerging 
from the sub-prime mortgage market.  More stringent measures would reduce the role 
of the financial markets in funding companies, but the direction of international travel 
has been towards increased market based development.  A movement towards a more 
commercial approach has been seen in US universities as well, for regulatory, 
technological, administrative, and financial reasons (Mowery et al, 2001). 
 
In this section, we investigate the effect of alternative responses to portfolio 
characteristics on innovation during the crisis.  In our first counterfactual companies 
continue to work on the same projects as before, and the patenting in January 2008 
and over 2008-9 is calculated as if they were experiencing the same output response 
to those projects as universities.  Our second counterfactual examines outcomes when 
universities adopt the response of companies.  Calculations are performed based on 
the parameters estimated in table 2. 
 
The statistics we examine are expected late predictions calculated from equations (4) 
and (6), minus the early predictions, and summed across all patent classes: 
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where E denotes the expectations operator, Y  denotes the fitted value of Y, and the 
other notation is as for equations (3) and (6).  The expected predicted patents counts 
are calculated as 
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where the additional notation is as below equation (3).  The exponential error term is 
calculated as 
 
)5.0exp())(exp( 2σ=tuE  
 
where σ is the root mean squared error from the estimations in table 2.  For the 
counterfactuals, we replace one or more of the coefficients and exponentiated error 
term from the estimated equation with the coefficients and error from the alternative 
equation.  In the summations, we do not sum over elements with extreme predicted 
values, using the same definitions of extreme values as in section 5. 
 
Table 5 presents our results, with the top panel showing patenting in January 2008 and 
the bottom panel showing cumulative patenting over 2008-9.  Columns one and two 
use negative binomial predictions, while columns three and four use OLS predictions.  
In column one we see the consequences of the crisis response to the characteristics of 
US company innovation becoming like that experienced by US universities.  The top 
panel shows the immediate effect.  There is a substantial impact on patenting in 
January 2008, with 2,300 fewer patent applications.  In the low panel, the cumulative 
effect of the change is shown.  The decline in US company patenting goes from 
111,000 applications to 195,000 applications, representing an additional loss of 
innovation outputs of 84,000 applications. 
 
 213 
Table 5 
Patenting change during the crisis on switching to a different institution’s response parameters while 
maintaining the original institution’s innovation portfolio 
Estimation method Negative binomial OLS  
From parameters and 
innovation portfolio of 
US 
companies 
US 
universities 
US 
companies 
US 
universities 
     
To parameters of US 
universities 
US 
companies 
US 
universities 
US 
companies 
In January 2008     
Expected patent crisis 
change before adjustment -558 -54 -262 -34 
 
    
Expected change after all 
adjustment -2890 -6 -2,359 22 
Cumulative over 2008-9 
    
Expected patent crisis 
change before adjustment -110,912 -11,455 -46,367 -2,419 
 
    
Expected change after all 
adjustment -194,716 -5,589 -95,092 -1,337 
 
In the counterfactual in column two, US universities are fully integrated in the market 
and their patenting changes as if they were US companies during the crisis.  From the 
top panel, it can be seen that adopting the alternative responses is associated with an 
increase in patenting of 48 applications.  The lower panel shows that the cumulative 
effect over 2008-9 of adopting the alternative responses is large relative to base 
patenting; the decline in innovation goes from 11,500 applications to 5,600 
applications, so there are an extra 5,900 patents.  Columns three and four show that 
OLS estimated effects of changing responses are qualitatively similar to negative 
binomial estimated effects. 
 
Our counterfactuals find that US university responses diminish patenting for US 
companies, while US company responses increase patenting for US universities.  
Company responses ensure greater innovation given the portfolio characteristics of 
companies and universities.  Their advantage occurs both in relation to the financial 
external dependence of innovation projects, and other factors including market 
demand. 
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8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have looked at how the innovator type affected innovation during the 
2007-8 financial crisis.  Our theoretical and empirical results indicate that, at the start 
of the crisis, the effect of external financial dependence on the change in patent counts 
was insignificant for projects undertaken by companies but significantly positive for 
projects undertaken by universities.  Higher proportions of intangible assets were 
associated with increased university patenting.  The effects were similar over the 
2008-9 period, although external financial dependence gained a significant positive 
association with company patenting.  Similar effects are shown for innovative projects 
in technology classes introduced before 1991; the results for newer classes are not as 
strong but may be influenced by a relatively small sample size. 
 
Counterfactuals indicate that if US company patenting responded in the same way as 
university patenting its decline would have been greater.  Conversely, US universities 
would have had smaller declines if they had the same patenting response as US 
companies.  We have not considered the possibility of innovation portfolio 
characteristics being selected in response to the funding used, which would alter 
counterfactual patent count changes.  An analysis of endogenous selection could start 
from the theoretical basis described in the managerial literature on multiple 
interactions and influences between enterprise capabilities, competitive environment, 
and strategy (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997). 
 
Our results echo those of Paunov (2012), who found that use of public funds by Latin 
American companies was associated with less discontinuation of their innovative 
projects during the crisis, whereas use of private funds was not significantly 
associated with it.  Our data inspection and theoretical model suggest that the results 
can be explained by the increase of aggregate public R&D funding and moderate 
persistence of aggregate private R&D funding, at least in the US.  The question then 
arises, why did private innovation funding not collapse during the crisis?  Campello et 
al (2010) present a possible explanation, by finding that while total international 
company investment did fall sharply during the crisis, capital investments were 
relatively robust.  Future work could establish whether innovation projects are 
accorded a protected status during crises, and whether particular types of projects are 
given more protection than others. 
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Although we did not dwell on the matter in the main text, it is interesting to note that 
persistence of innovation in each patent class was much higher for companies than for 
universities.  One possible explanation is that universities are more willing to break 
radically with their past innovation during crises, perhaps acting as agents of creative 
destruction to a greater extent than companies (see Archibugi et al (2013a) and 
Archibugi et al (2013b)).  Universities may have fewer institutional constraints 
stopping them from becoming radical innovators.  However, groundbreaking 
innovations may be put by the USPTO into the same patent class as less significant 
innovations in the short term, because of delays in introduction of new classes.  So 
short term patent classification is an imperfect way of recognising technological shifts.  
Moreover, an alternative institutional explanation for the persistence gap is possible, 
in that universities are able to retreat from the market in a way that is not possible for 
companies.  Further study could clarify the reasons for the gap. 
 
Our theoretical and empirical results suggest policy applications relating to the 
selection of solutions to informational and control problems in the principal-agent 
relations that arise in innovation.  Solutions using financial markets may be 
susceptible to collapse during financial crises, and when they occur or are threatened 
it may be preferable to adopt elements of the non-market solutions used in university 
funding by industry or government, including direct or peer monitoring rather than 
commercially intermediated monitoring, and sharing technologies and profits between 
the funding and funded parties.  However, the value of these relations during a crisis 
is dependent on the political commitment to fund innovation.  If this commitment is 
lacking – which it generally was in crises prior to 2007-8 – then university relations 
may perform worse than company relations as funding conduits.  Moreover, even 
during the crisis of 2007-8, company commercial innovative outputs were maintained 
at a higher level than university outputs.  If maintenance of such outputs is sought by 
policymakers, universities could learn from the productive process of companies 
during crises.  We leave it to future work to determine the exact nature of the lessons. 
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